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armland preservation has become a growing societal concern
over the past two decades and is now a common component of
any serious discussion of environmental land-use controls.
Although some disagreement remains on the necessity of preserving
farmland,' there is no doubt that prime farmland is being converted at
substantial rates.
* Professor, College of Law, Northern Illinois University. This article is based
on a paper prepared for Protecting Farmland at the Fringe: Do Regulations Work?,
Conference, Baltimore, Maryland, September 5-7, 2001.
1. The rationales for farmland preservation fall into two broad categories: (1) food
security and (2) environmental amenities. Food security refers to the concern that farmland
conversion threatens our long-term ability to produce sufficient amounts of food to either
feed ourselves or respond to future global needs. Environmental amenities refer to various
environmental benefits created by farmland, including groundwater recharge, control of
stormwater runoff, wildlife habitat, open-space preservation, and avoiding environmental
costs associated with shifting rangeland and forests to the cropland base. The food security
issue in particular has been the subject of intense debate in recent years, with some
commentators arguing this remains a matter of concern. See, e.g., Luther Tweeten, Food
Security and Farmland Preservation, 3 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 237 (1998); David Pimentel &
Marci Pimentel, U.S. Food Production Threatened by Rapid Population Growth, at
http://www.enviroweb.org/gaiapc/Pimentel2.html (last modified Oct. 30, 1997). But see,
e.g., Peter Gordon & Harry Richardson, Farmland Preservation and Ecological Footprints,
at http://www-pam.usc.edu/volumel/vlila2print.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 1999)
(questioning such assumptions).
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This is particularly true in many of our nation's most productive
agricultural areas, where farmland is often under substantial conversion
pressure from advancing suburban development.2 Whatever its broader
worth to society as farmland, to the immediate parties involved the land is
more valuable converted. This increasingly includes some of the nation's
best and most productive farmland.
All levels of government have perceived farmland preservation as an
important societal goal and have responded with a variety of programs to
slow and control the rate of conversion. 3 Some programs might be viewed
as voluntary incentives to encourage farmers not to convert farmland, such
as special tax incentive programs,
4
2. The problem of farmland conversion first gained national attention with
publication of the National Agricultural Lands Study (NALS) in 1981, conducted by the
United States Department of Agriculture and the President's Council on Environmental
Quality. The study included a comprehensive inventory of the nation's agricultural land
base and examined conversion rates and projected future needs for farmland. The study
concluded that the nation was losing more than three million acres of agricultural land every
year, including one million acres from our cropland base. The study attributed most of the
loss to changing living patterns, and in particular the spreading of residential development
into rural America. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE & PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, NATIONAL AGRICULTURE LANDS STUDY, FINAL REPORT (1981).
A recent and comprehensive study by the American Farmland Trust confirmed
the continuing loss of farmland and some of its potential consequences. The study analyzed
conversion patterns and development pressures within each of the nation's 181 Major Land
Resource Areas (MLRAs), geographic regions defined by the Department of Agricultural as
having homogenous characteristics relevant to farming. The study found not only that every
state was losing some of its best farmland to development, but a substantial amount of the
nation's remaining prime farmland was under significant development pressure. In
particular, seventy percent of the nation's MLRAs had high quality farmland under
significant development pressure. See A. ANN SORENSEN ET. AL., AMERICAN FARMLAND
TRUST, FARMING ON THE EDGE 2-3, 8-20 (1997).
3. Congress has passed several statutes designed to facilitate and encourage
farmland preservation, including the Farmland Protection Policy Act of 1981, 7 U.S.C. §§
4201-4209 (1994), and the Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform Act of 1996
(FAIRA), Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 888 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
provisions of Title 7 of the United States Code). Most efforts at farmland preservation,
however, have been at the state and local level. For overviews of state and local farmland
preservation programs, see William L. Church, Farmland Conversion: The View from 1986,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 521; Jerome G. Rose, Farmland Preservation Policy and Programs,
24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 591 (1984).
4. All fifty states have some form of tax relief provisions for agricultural land.
Most common are preferential-assessment statutes, which assess land at reduced value when
used for agriculture, and deferred taxation programs, which provide lower assessment for
farmland but require partial or total repayment of tax savings if the land is converted to
other uses. For a listing of all fifty state statutes, see American Farmland Trust, State
Farmland Protection Statutes by Category (Table), at
http://www.farmlandinfo.org/fic/laws/fpkeytab.html (last visited July 23, 2001).
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recognition of agricultural districts,5 and right-to-farm laws.6 Other
programs seek to more permanently restrict a landowner's right to convert
by paying for development rights on the property. Most notable are
Purchase of Development Rights (PDR) programs in which government
purchases the development rights on farmland, paying the landowner the
difference between the property's value if more intensive development is
allowed and its value as farmland.7 Similarly, Transfer of Development
Rights (TDR) programs also compensate landowners for lost development
rights, but instead of cash landowners are given development rights that
can be used elsewhere.8
Each program has a role to play in any comprehensive effort to
preserve farmland, but in and of itself is inadequate. Right-to-farm laws
are only effective in preventing involuntary conversion against a
landowner's wishes; they do little to protect farmland when an owner
desires to convert. Similarly, differential tax programs and agricultural
districting can provide temporary relief from conversion pressure, but
neither is sufficient to offset the financial incentive of conversion when
significant development pressure exists.9  On the other hand, PDR
programs, though effective in preserving farmland when implemented, are
necessarily limited in their scope because of the significant costs involved.
TDR programs avoid this problem by providing development rights instead
5. Agricultural districting involves the voluntary creation of agricultural districts,
which typically requires that they be used for agricultural purposes for a minimum number
of years. In exchange for the requirement that the land stay agricultural, landowners receive
various benefits which, depending on the authorizing statute, might include restrictions on
special assessments and limitations on the use of eminent domain. See LINDA A. MALONE,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE § 6.37 (2001).
6. Right-to-farm laws, found in all fifty states, protect farms against nuisance
actions where development moves out to agricultural areas and creates conflicting uses. For
a listing of all fifty states' "right to farm" statutes, see American Farmland Trust, State
Farmland Protection Statutes by Category (Table), at
http://www.farmlandinfo.org/fic/laws/fpkeytab.html (last visited July 23, 2001).
7. For descriptions of PDR programs, see MALONE, supra note 5, § 6.46; TOM
DANIELS & DEBORAH BOWERS, HOLDING OUR GROUND: PROTECTING AMERICA'S FARMS AND
FARMLAND 145-69 (1997).
8. There is a significant body of literature on TDR programs. See generally John
J. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973);
Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer et. al., Transferable Development Rights and Alternatives
After Suitum, 30 URB. LAW. 441 (1998). For descriptions of how TDR programs might
work with farmland preservation, see DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 7, at 179-86
(describing six different TDR programs designed to protect farmland).
9. Various commentators have voiced this concern about voluntary types of
programs. See, e.g., SARAH E. REDFIELD, VANISHING FARMLAND: A LEGAL SOLUTION FOR
THE STATES, 96-97, 103 (1984); Church, supra note 3, at 550.
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of money, but are contingent upon the right mix of development
ingredients to succeed, especially appropriate "receiving areas." As a
result, few successful TDR programs have emerged.' °
For these reasons, agricultural zoning has emerged as the foundation
of most farmland preservation efforts, reflecting several distinct
advantages. On the one hand, agricultural zoning restricts a landowner's
own decision to convert the property to more intensive uses, thus avoiding
the limitations of voluntary programs. On the other hand, zoning avoids
the financial limitations of PDR programs by placing the cost of
preservation on the landowner. It has the added advantage of being a
familiar and widely used land use control mechanism, thus assuring its
acceptability to the general public.
Despite these strengths, zoning itself is not without its disadvantages.
These include frequent legal challenges to restrictions, the perceived
unfairness of placing the cost of preservation on affected landowners, and
the potential for unanticipated impacts on broader community
development. Perhaps most significant, however, is the concern that
zoning restrictions are susceptible to change when development pressure
increases, making it an unstable and, in the long run, ineffective
preservation method. Moreover, if not properly implemented, agricultural
zoning can actually exacerbate, rather than limit, sprawl, by spreading
development too broadly.
This article will examine agricultural zoning as a farmland
preservation tool. Part one will briefly examine types of agricultural
zoning restrictions. Part two, which is the main focus of the article, will
examine the impacts of agricultural zoning from four perspectives: (1) Its
Legal Impact; (2) Its Economic Impact; (3) Its Development Impact; and
(4) Its Effectiveness as a farmland preservation tool. Finally, the last
section of the article will give some brief recommendations on the
directions agricultural zoning might take.
I. TYPES OF AGRICULTURAL ZONING
Agricultural zoning, which began to gain wide acceptance in the
1970's and 1980's, is found today in a large number of counties throughout
the country and provides the foundation for most farmland preservation
10. See Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative
Discussion of Environmental and Land Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 565, 574-79 (1992) (discussing difficulties in establishing successful
TDR programs).
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efforts." At least fourteen states currently have statutes which specifically
address and authorize particular forms of "agricultural protection zoning,"
12
but as a practical matter agricultural zoning should normally fall within
local government's general zoning power, even in the absence of a specific
statute. Because it can preclude conversion of farmland even when
significant development pressure exists, zoning is a widely and
increasingly used farmland preservation technique at the local level.
Agricultural zoning can be generally divided into two basic types:
exclusive and non-exclusive agricultural zoning. Exclusive agricultural
zoning prohibits any use of the land other than agricultural.13 Even this
type of zoning will permit certain compatible or accessory buildings, such
as barns, on the property; fundamentally, however, exclusive agricultural
zoning is designed to limit the property to agricultural use only.
The second and more common approach is non-exclusive agricultural
zoning, which permits non-farm uses, most notably residential, but in effect
establishes agricultural zoning restrictions through severe density
limitations. To be effective this requires large minimum lot size
restrictions, where the minimum lot size typically would correspond to the
minimum size of commercial farms in the area.' Thus, minimum lot sizes
might range from one house per 40 acres to one house per 160 acres. The
obvious effect is to limit the property to agricultural use. A minimum lot
size restriction might also take the form of a "sliding scale" restriction,
which decreases the dwellings per acre as acreage goes up.15  Thus, the
ordinance might permit one dwelling for the first ten acres, one for the next
twenty, and one for each thirty acres after that. This permits greater
residential development for smaller parcels, which are less likely to be
devoted to farming, while retaining the essentially agricultural nature of
larger units.
Another variation on non-exclusive zoning is cluster zoning, which
establishes overall density restrictions on property but permits small lot
"clustering" of actual development on the property. For example, an
overall density of one unit for ten acres might be established, but actual
11. See DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 7, at 106 (stating that agricultural zoning is
currently used in over 500 counties and communities).
12. See American Farmland Trust, State Farmland Protection Statutes by Category
(Table), at http://www.farmlandinfo.org/fic/laws/fpkeytab.html (last visited July 23, 2001)
(listing all fourteen states).
13. See MALONE, supra note 5, § 6.32.
14. See MALONE, supra note 5, §§ 6.27-6.31. As will be discussed later, more
lenient lot size restrictions, such as one house per five acres, do little to preserve farmland
and might even exacerbate sprawl.
15. See MALONE, supra note 5, § 6.30.
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development is "clustered" together at a greater density, leaving a
significant area of land free for farming. 16 This provides an opportunity for
greater residential development while at the same time preserving large
sections of land for agricultural use.
Whatever its form, if done correctly, agricultural zoning serves the
purpose of significantly limiting development on farmland property, thus
preserving the property's farmland status. Importantly, by placing public
restrictions on the property the landowner is not free to sell the land for
nonagricultural use when development pressure and attendant financial
incentives become great. The result is to place the cost of preservation, as
reflected in diminution in land value, on the restricted landowner.
As noted earlier, agricultural zoning is not exclusive of other farmland
preservation methods, and often is most effective when combined with
other tools. For example, when used, TDRs are typically combined with
agricultural zoning as a way to mitigate the economic impact of zoning. 17
Similarly, PDR programs work best with agricultural zoning as a
foundation. This not only helps keep purchase prices at a reasonable level,
but addresses the reality that PDR programs rarely have the necessary
funds to preserve necessary land immediately.' 8 Differential tax programs
can also serve to mitigate the economic impact imposed by agricultural
zoning.
In addition to the more traditional tools, agricultural zoning has also
been combined with urban growth boundaries (UGB) in some instances to
preserve farmland. An UGB in essence is a line drawn beyond which
development will be prohibited, thus directing growth pressure inward
instead of sprawling out. Oregon, in particular, has been a leader in
combining UGBs with agricultural zoning as a method of preserving
substantial areas of farmland, although the results have been somewhat
mixed.19
16. See DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 7, at 121-23.
17. See Edward Thompson, Jr., "Hybrid" Farmland Protection Programs: A New
Paradigm for Growth Management, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 831, 840-44
(1999).
18. See id. at 844-45.
19. See DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 7, at 139-41; Jeanne S. White, Beating
Plowshares into Townhomes: The Loss of Farmland and Strategies for Slowing its
Conversion to Nonagricultural Uses, 28 ENVTL. L. 113, 120 (1998).
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Finally, important components of any zoning scheme, including
agricultural zoning, are mechanisms for change. Zoning ordinances
typically have three primary ways in which a land use restriction might be
changed: variances, special-use designations, and rezoning of the land.20
As applied to agricultural zoning, the most significant of these is actual
rezoning of the property. At bottom, this is simply a mechanism by which
a previous restriction on land use can be changed to permit other, and often
more intensive land uses. At their best, such change mechanisms provide
flexibility to zoning schemes so that they can be sensitive to changing
societal and local needs. At their worst, they undermine long-term needs in
order to bend to short term political and market expediencies.
Agricultural zoning, in all its variations and partnerships with other
tools, is the primary basis for preserving farmland today. The next section
of this paper will analyze the impact of agricultural zoning from four
perspectives: (1) Its Legal Impact; (2) Its Economic Impact, especially
from the landowner's perspective; (3) Its Development Impact; and (4) Its
Effectiveness as a farmland preservation tool.
II. IMPACTS
A. THE LEGAL IMPACT: CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON AGRICULTURAL
ZONING
An initial impact for analysis is the legal impact of agricultural
zoning, and in particular what restraints might exist on its use as a farmland
preservation method. There are, of course, various state laws that restrain
zoning as a land use control device, including state enabling acts and more
specialized doctrines. 2 As a practical matter, however, the primary and
most significant limitations on zoning are those found in the Fifth
Amendment takings clause to the United States Constitution, which will be
the focus of this section. Indeed, because of the significant economic
20. For a general description on how these mechanisms work, see DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 223-59 (2d ed. 1988).
21. For example, several states follow what is known as the "change or mistake"
rule in reviewing rezonings. This rule requires that a rezoning is valid only if conditions
have changed since the original zoning or if the original zoning was based on a mistake of
some type. See MANDELKER, supra note 20, at 227-29. This doctrine has been used to
invalidate an attempted downzoning of land to an agricultural district. See City of Va.
Beach v. Va. Land Assessment Ass'n., 389 S.E.2d 312, 314 (Va. 1990).
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impact that agricultural zoning can have on land values as compared to
alternative uses involving development, landowners have frequently argued
that agricultural zoning constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property.
This section will briefly analyze the constitutional validity of agricultural
zoning as a land use device, with special attention given to the effect of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island.22
Current Supreme Court takings doctrine recognizes that in very
limited situations the economic impact of a land use regulation might be so
severe as to constitute an unconstitutional taking of property. This
"regulatory taking" doctrine was first recognized in the seminal decision of
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,23 and over the years has proven to be a
source of considerable litigation and confusion.24 The Court currently
applies a two-fold analysis for determining when the economic impact of a
land use restriction constitutes a taking. First, as stated in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council,25 a regulation constitutes a taking if it deprives a
landowner of "all economic viability. 26
22. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
23. 260 U.S. 393 (1992).
24. Numerous commentators have noted the confusing state of the Supreme Court's
takings jurisprudence over the years. See, e.g., ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF
PROPERTY 514 (2d ed. 1993) (noting the lack of clear standards has led to confusion); J.
Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for Abolition of the Regulatory Takings Doctrine, 22 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 89, 103 (1995) (calling it an unworkable "muddle"); Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the
Quark. Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis,
70 WASH. L. REV. 91, 92 (1995) ("[rlegulatory takings are proving to be one of the enduring
legal dilemmas of the twentieth century.").
25. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
26. The Court in Lucas characterized this as a "categorical taking," meaning that
once a loss of all economic viability is established there is no need for a balancing of
interests. Id. at 1015-16. In recognizing a taking based on loss of economic viability, the
Court pointed to a number of previous cases in which it had stated, albeit in dicta, that a
taking occurs when a regulation denies an owner "all economically beneficial or productive
use of land." Id.; see, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Agins v. City
of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
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The Court did not clarify what this term might mean, but found it was
met when a regulation left land "valueless," as was the case in Lucas.
2 7
Second, the Court in Lucas stated that even when a regulation falls
short of eliminating all economic viability, the regulation might still
constitute a taking under what has become known as the Penn Central
factors.2 8 Those factors come from Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City,29 in which the Court identified the character of the
government action, its economic impact, and the degree of interference
with investment-backed expectations as being particularly significant
factors in determining whether a restriction was a taking. In that decision
the Court held that the challenged restriction on use of air rights did not
constitute a taking, both because the restriction still permitted a reasonable
return on the land and because the challenged landmark law did not
interfere with the original purpose of the property.3°
The Supreme Court itself has never applied this two-fold takings
analysis to an agricultural zoning restriction. However, a significant
number of lower courts have addressed takings challenges to agricultural
zoning restrictions, with the vast majority of cases holding that the
restriction was not a taking.3' These lower court decisions have taken
various approaches in resolving takings claims, in part reflecting unique
state standards, but have for the most part approached takings analysis
consistent with the above Supreme Court test. Thus, lower courts have
frequently stated that agricultural zoning is not a taking as long as the land
is suitable for agricultural use and is economically viable, which is almost
27. The Court in Lucas did recognize an exception to the loss of all economic
viability rule, stating that even this extreme impact would not constitute a taking if the
regulation was preventing what would amount to a common law nuisance. 505 U.S. at
1029-31. The Court reasoned that since under common law concepts of property a
landowner cannot cause a nuisance to his or her neighbor, the activity being regulated would
not "inhere in the title" to begin with. Id. For that reason the Court remanded the case to
the South Carolina courts, noting that although there was no economic viability, the issue of
whether the statute was preventing a common law nuisance was a matter of state law. Id. at
1031.
28. See id. at 1019 n.8.
29. 438 U.S. 104 (1977).
30. Id. at 136.
31. See, e.g., Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161 (9th
Cir. 1993); Barancik v. County of Matin, 872 F.2d 8334 (9th Cir. 1988); Gisler v. County of
Madera, 112 Cal. Rptr. 919 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974); County of Ada v. Henry, 668 P.2d 994
(Idaho 1983); Wilson v. County of McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426 (11. App. Ct. 1981); Gardner
v. N.J. Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991); Murray v. Columbia River Gorge
Comm'n, 865 P.2d 1319 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
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always the case.32 Moreover, lower courts have frequently emphasized that
the restriction did not interfere with a landowner's investment-backed
expectations under Penn Central, either because the property was
originally acquired for farming33 or because the restrictions were in place
when the land was bought.34
On those few occasions where lower courts have found a taking to
exist, it was usually because the land was truly unsuitable for farming and
thus denied the landowner economically viable use of the land. For
example, in Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake,35 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
found an agricultural zoning restriction invalid where it was admittedly
used as a "holding" classification for future use, despite the unsuitability of
the land for farming.
32. See, e.g., Christensen, 995 F.2d at 165; Jafay v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of
Boulder County, 848 P.2d 892 (Colo. 1993).
33. See Gardner, 593 A.2d at 261; Gilliland v. City of Palmdale, 179 Cal. Rptr.
627, 632-33 (1981).
34. See County of Ada v. Henry, 668 P.2d 994 (Idaho 1983); Harvard State Bank v.
County of McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360 (11. App. Ct. 1993).
35. 211 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 1973). For another example, see Petersen v. City of
Decorah, 259 N.W.2d 553, 553 (Iowa Ct. App. 1977), where the court found an agricultural
zoning restriction "unreasonable and confiscatory" where the city acknowledged it zoned
the land agricultural as a holding classification, even though it was unsuitable for
agricultural use and had not been productive for years.
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As a general matter, however, courts have consistently held that
agricultural zoning does not constitute an unconstitutional taking where the
property can be effectively used for farming purposes, even if it involves a
substantial economic burden on the landowner. 36
The lower court decisions generally upholding agricultural zoning
against takings challenges appear to be consistent with what had been the
standard view of the Lucas/Penn Central takings analysis. The Supreme
Court's most recent regulatory takings case, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,37
decided in June of 2001, has the potential of significantly impacting
regulatory takings analysis in several important respects. Although
Palazzolo itself involved a coastal wetlands restriction, the Court's analysis
is applicable to a broad array of land use restrictions, including agricultural
zoning. Thus, some attention must be given to how Palazzolo will impact
the validity of agricultural zoning restrictions.
In Palazzolo the Supreme Court reviewed a wetlands regulation which
had been in place when the claimant acquired the propert? 8 and had the
effect of prohibiting all development except the possible building of a
house on several uplands acres. Although several issues were at play in
36. The state that has decided the most agricultural zoning cases, Illinois, takes a
unique, approach to zoning, applying a multifactor balancing test. See, e.g., Twigg v.
County of Will, 627 N.E.2d 742 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). This test blends both substantive due
process and takings concerns and results in greater scrutiny of zoning decisions than is
typically found in other states. Even so, the majority of Illinois decisions reviewing
agricultural zoning restrictions have found them valid. See, e.g., Harvard State Bank v.
County of McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1095, 1098-99 (ll. App. Ct. 1993); Wilson v. County of
McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426, 432 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). In several cases, however, Illinois
courts have struck down agricultural zoning restrictions under the multi-factor balancing
test. See Twigg, 627 N.E.2d at 746; Harris Bank of Hinsdale v. County of Kendall, 625
N.E.2d 845, 846 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Pettee v. County of DeKalb, 376 N.E.2d 720, 725 (Il.
App. Ct. 1978); Semja v. County of Boone, 339 N.E.2d 452, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). In
none of these cases, however, did the court suggest that the severe economic impact of
agricultural zoning would constitute a taking. Rather, the restrictions were struck down in
Semja and Pettee because the zoned property was unsuitable for fanning. Semja, 339 N.E.2d
at 455; Pettee, 376 N.E.2d at 725. In Twigg the restrictions were invalid because they were
not the product of careful planning, while in Harris Bank they were struck down as being
inconsistent with the county's comprehensive plan. Twigg, 627 N.E.2d at 745; Harris Bank,
625 N.E.2d at 849-50.
37. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
38. A corporation owned by Palazzolo had actually purchased the property prior to
the challenged restrictions being placed on the property. A year after restrictions were
placed on the property, however, the corporation was dissolved for. nonpayment of taxes and
Palazzolo personally became owner of the property as a matter of law. Both the Rhode
Island Supreme Court and United States Supreme Court treated Palazzolo as acquiring the
property with notice of the restrictions. Id. at 614.
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PalaZZolo,39 the most significant was whether notice of a restriction when
property is acquired precludes a takings claim. The Rhode Island Supreme
Court, following the majority of lower courts, said it did.40  In a 5-4
decision, the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that notice of
a restriction does not preclude a taking claim. It went on to hold,
however, that under the facts Palazzolo had not been denied all
economically viable use of the property, since a house could be built on
several acres of uplands property adjacent to the restricted eighteen acres of
wetlands. The Court therefore remanded the case for a determination of
whether a taking had occurred under the Penn Central factors.42
The immediate impact of Palazzolo on agricultural zoning is twofold.
First, and most obvious, is that a takings claim will not be precluded just
because the agricultural zoning was in place when the property was
acquired.43  Although this has not been a common scenario in the
agricultural zoning cases reported so far, it will likely become more
common as time passes. As such, courts will be required to apply the two-
fold Lucas/Penn Central analysis to all agricultural zoning restrictions
challenged as takings,44 regardless of when the property was acquired.
Importantly, however, although notice no longer precludes a takings
claim, a close reading of Palazzolo indicates that it can still be considered
as a factor in analyzing the interference with investment-backed
expectations under Penn Central. In a concurring opinion Justice
O'Connor stated that, although notice should not preclude a takings claim,
neither should it be irrelevant when analyzing the degree of interference
39. An initial issue was whether the case was ripe for decision, with the state
arguing 'that it was not yet ripe because no final decision had been made on whether
development could occur. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that the
manner in which earlier development applications had been rejected indicated that the state
environmental council would reject even less ambitious development proposals made by
Palazzolo. Id. at 618-26.
40. See Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 716 (R.I. 2000).
41. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 625-29.
42. Id. at 629-30.
43. Prior to Palazzolo, a majority of lower courts had held that prior notice
precluded a takings claim. Some reached this conclusion on the basis that notice negated
any investment-backed expectations under Penn Central. See, e.g., Good v. United States,
189 F.3d 1355, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Claridge v. N.H. Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287, 291
(N.H. 1984). However, other courts held that prior regulations constituted "background
principles of law" under Lucas. See, e.g., Hunriker v. Iowa, 519 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Iowa
1994); Gazza v. N.Y. Dep't of Envt'l. Conservation, 679 N.E.2d 1035 (N.Y. 1997).
44. The Court affirmed the two-part Lucas/Penn Central analysis, and made clear
that though a regulation permits economically viable use of land, it must still be analyzed
under Penn Central. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 616-17, 631-32.
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with investment-backed expectations under Penn Central.4 5  Four other
justices agreed with O'Connor on this point, making a majority of the
Court.46 Although it is unclear what weight to give it in any situation, to
the extent the owner knew of the restriction, it makes it less likely to be a
taking under Penn Central.
The second immediate impact of Palazzolo on agricultural zoning is
its affirmation that even minimal economic activity is enough to avoid a
categorical taking under Lucas. In this sense Palazzolo is quite supportive
of the validity of agricultural zoning. In affirming that the building of a
"substantial home" on eighteen acres is economically viable, the Court was
indicating that a Lucas categorical taking is limited to only extreme
impacts. Indeed, in Palazzolo the landowner had sought $3,130,000 for
lost profits from not being able to develop the land, but the Court instead
focused on the $200,000 value of the upland property as evidence of
economic viability.47  If anything, this aspect of Palazzolo strengthens
lower courts' consistent recognition that agriculturally zoned land meets
the economically viable threshold as long as the land is suitable for
farming.48
Where does this leave the validity of agricultural zoning restrictions?
Despite the shake-up created by Palazzolo, it is reasonable to predict that
the vast majority of agricultural zoning restrictions, if done pursuant to
sound planning and ensuring that the property is suitable for farming,
should still be constitutional. First, there is little doubt that proper
agricultural zoning permits some economically viable use of the property
and thereby avoids a categorical finding under Lucas. As noted above, if
anything Palazzolo strengthens agricultural zoning under the first part of
the test.
The real question, therefore, is how agricultural zoning restrictions
will hold up under the Penn Central analysis, which Palazzolo makes clear
must still be applied even when the land remains economically viable. The
short answer is that this should not pose a problem in most cases for several
45. Id. at 631-32.
46. Id. at 638-45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 654
n.3 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 654 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 630-31.
48. See, e.g., Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161, 165
(9th Cir. 1993); Jafay v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Boulder County, 848 P.2d 892 (Colo.
1993). See generally Glenn P. Sugameli, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: The
Categorical and Other "Exceptions" to Liability for Fifth Amendment Takings of Private
Property Far Outweigh the Rule, 29 ENVTL. L. 939, 946-47 (1999) (analyzing the highly
unusual nature of Lucas type categorical takings, which are limited to "losses of all value
and use").
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reasons. First, although not precluding a takings claim, Palazzolo indicates
that knowledge of a restriction can be a factor in analyzing the degree of
interference with investment-backed expectations.49 Penn Central itself
labeled this the most important factor,5° and it seems to work against a
landowner who was aware of the restriction when the property was
purchased. Thus, in those instances where the claimant knew of the
restriction, it would be very unusual to find a taking under Penn Central.
Therefore, to the extent the Penn Central analysis poses a problem for
agricultural zoning, it would be where restrictions are imposed after the
claimant acquired the property. Even here, however, Penn Central
suggests most agricultural restrictions are valid, even if resulting in
substantial diminution in value compared to other, more intensive land
uses. 51  This is clearest where the original purchase price reflects
agricultural use and value, and only later did the value greatly appreciate,
probably due to subsequent nearby development. Although downzoning in
such a situation clearly has an economic impact on the affected landowner,
it would not amount to the degree of investment-backed expectations
necessary for a taking contemplated by Penn Central. Indeed, Penn
Central itself involved essentially this same scenario, where what had been
permitted development was eliminated, resulting in significant economic
impact, but not interfering with what had been the original expectation of
the owner."
More difficult is where property is zoned to permit development and
is purchased at a price reflecting such development potential, and then is
downzoned to permit only agricultural use. Although this would appear to
be the strongest case for a taking under Penn Central, even here the Court
has indicated such downzoning can inflict substantial economic losses and
still not be a taking. Otherwise, it would be impossible to enact new
zoning restrictions and other regulations necessary to address changing
societal needs.
49. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 617-18.
50. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
51. Id. at 131.
52. Id. at 135-36.
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For that reason the Court has consistently indicated that even newly
enacted land use restrictions, which change previous understandings of
development opportunities and thereby diminish property values, are still
generally constitutional.53 Indeed, the Court in Palazzolo itself took care to
affirm this basic point.54
This position is also supported by the notion of regulatory risk, a
concept that helps inform the reasonableness of any investment-backed
expectations under Penn Central. The Supreme Court recognized this in
Lucas, where it stated, "[i]t seems to us that the property owner necessarily
expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by
various measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its
police powers. 55  This builds on statements by the Court in other
regulatory contexts, in which it has strongly affirmed the idea that the risk
of regulation is part of economic life, which includes the distinct possibility
of economic loss.56 Thus, even when landowners have purchased property
at prices reflecting permitted development opportunities, which are later
subsequently restricted resulting in economic loss, a taking has not
necessarily occurred.57
When, therefore, might an agricultural zoning restriction on land
suitable for farming constitute a taking under the Penn Central analysis?
Although the vagueness of the test makes any predictions speculative, it
would seem to require more than either buying property in reliance on
53. See id. at 136; Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 225 (1980) (holding that a
zoning ordinance that limited development did not constitute a taking); Vill. of Euclid v.
Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding zoning ordinance which resulted in a
seventy-five percent diminution in value of land).
54. 533 U.S. at 613. The Court acknowledged the commonly accepted principle
that "a prospective enactment, such as a new zoning ordinance, can limit the value of land
without effecting a taking because it can be understood as reasonable by all concerned." Id.
55. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
56. The Supreme Court has often stated that "[tihose who do business in the
regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent
amendments to achieve the legislative end." FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91
(1958); Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal.,
508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (quoting Darlington, 358 U.S. at 91); Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 227 (1986) (quoting Darlington, 358 U.S. at 91).
57. Commentators have also argued that reasonable expectations of property use
must include the possibility of further regulation which diminish property values. See John
A. Humbach, Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MiNN. L. REV. 339, 367 (1989) (characterizing
purchase of undeveloped land as a "gamble," part of which is "inherent risk that the
government may tighten the applicable regulations"); Frank I. Michelman, A Skeptical View
of "Property Rights " Legislation, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 409, 415 (1995) ("regulation [is]
an ordinary part of background risk and opportunity against which we all take our chances
... as investors in property.").
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current zoning restrictions or significant diminution in property values
when zoning occurs. Although both of those facts might be a necessary
predicate, it would seem to, in most instances at least, require problems
with the third Penn Central factor: character of the government action. In
particular, the more the restriction reflects sound planning principles, is
pursuant to a comprehensive plan, and does not single-out isolated owners
for restrictions,58 the less likely a taking would be found. Conversely, if the
zoning is ad hoc and narrowly focused on only a few landowners, together
with significant diminution in value, it approaches the type of extreme
situation that might constitute a taking under the Penn Central test.
As noted by both the majority and Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Palazzolo, the Penn Central test is necessarily quite flexible, and in the
final analysis must be governed by what "fairness and justice" would
dictate.59 Therefore, there might be unique circumstances in which even a
well-conceived and broadly applicable agricultural zoning restriction will
be a taking under Penn Central. Yet, as a general matter, the Court has
affirmed that newly enacted restrictions which change previous
understandings and result in substantial economic loss are still not
unconstitutional takings under Penn Central. Moreover, Palazzolo
indicates that to the extent the landowner had notice of the restrictions, that
can help inform the reasonableness of any investment-backed expectations,
making a taking under Penn Central even less likely.
In summary, if done pursuant to sound planning and restricting only
land suitable for farming, agricultural zoning should rarely, if ever,
constitute a taking under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. Although
the Court's recent decision in Palazzolo provides that landowner notice
does not preclude a takings claim, eliminating one basis on which courts
occasionally upheld land use restrictions,60 agricultural zoning should still
fare well under the two-fold Lucas/Penn Central analysis. First,
agricultural zoning will almost always permit economically viable use of
the land and therefore not constitute a categorical taking under Lucas, a
conclusion made even stronger by Palazzolo. Second, most agricultural
58. The Court has on occasion noted that one basis for upholding zoning
restrictions is the "reciprocity of advantage" they produce. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
This is commonly understood to mean that more broad based land restrictions provide
reciprocal benefits in the form of restrictions on others, which help offset the burdens
imposed on land.
59. 533 U.S. at 607 (stating that the Penn Central test must be applied according to
the purpose of the takings clause, which is to ensure "fairness and justice" under the
circumstances). Id.
60. See supra note 43.
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zonings should be valid under Penn Central, especially if the land had
originally been acquired for agricultural purposes.
Although agricultural zoning should generally not be a taking,
prudence suggests several basic steps to insulate zoning against even the
possibility of a taking. First, the restricted land must be suitable for
farming and not just be zoned agricultural as a "holding classification.''
Second, the zoning should occur pursuant to sound planning principles and
be broadly based, as opposed to targeting only a few properties. Third, to
the extent possible, the zoning should identify properties earlier rather than
later, when land values have appreciated substantially. Although this last
factor is far from fatal, early identification of land to be zoned agricultural
provides extra "breathing room" against takings challenges.
B. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT: IS AGRICULTURAL ZONING FAIR TO RESTRICT
TO LANDOWNERS?
Perhaps the clearest and most immediate impact of agricultural zoning
is on the regulated property owner.62  The effect of the regulation is to
eliminate development opportunities, and to restrict the property to
agricultural use. As a consequence, agriculturally zoned land frequently
suffers a significant diminution in value as compared to alternative uses
involving development.63 As a practical matter, therefore, the most
immediate financial impact of agricultural zoning is to shift the cost of
farmland preservation from society as a whole to landowners themselves.
This shifting of preservation costs to landowners has given rise to
concerns about the fairness of agricultural zoning. The essence of the
fairness argument is that agricultural zoning forces a few landowners to
bear the cost of preserving farmland for the benefit of society generally.
The typical rationales for preserving farmland, such as food security and
environmental amenities, go to society as a whole rather than the affected
landowner. Thus, the argument goes that if most of the benefits from
preservation go to society as a whole, then the cost of preservation should
be placed on society as well.
61. See Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 211 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 1973) (striking
down agricultural zoning restriction that was used simply as a "holding" classification).
62. The analysis presented here in Part 1I.B is a shortened version of discussions
presented in two earlier articles. See Mark W. Cordes, Takings, Fairness, and Farmland
Preservation, 60 OHIO STATE L.J. 1035, 1069-81 (1999); Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the
Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187, 226-38 (1997).
63. See, e.g., Harvard State Bank v. County of McHenry, 620 N.E.2d 1360 (II1.
App. Ct. 1993) (indicating a fifty percent diminution in value).
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As thus presented, the fairness argument does not necessarily dispute
the wisdom of farmland preservation, but instead questions who should pay
for it. Whatever the merits of preservation, it is arguably unfair to force a
few landowners to bear the burden of bestowing benefits on the rest of
society. Thus, the argument is made that if the benefits from preservation
go to society as a whole, then society should pay for such benefits in the
form of compensation to affected landowners. For this reason alternative
preservation schemes involving Purchase of Development Rights or
Transferrable Development Rights are viewed as more equitable in that
they shift the cost of preservation from the regulated landowner back to
society. 64
This fairness argument, very much a component of current discussions
about farmland preservation, has intuitive appeal and needs to be taken
seriously.65 Fundamentally, it raises the question of how the benefits and
burdens of land use controls should be distributed across society. In this
respect thought should be given to whether a disproportionate burden falls
on affected property owners, and how it might be at least partially
addressed. Certainly use of PDRs and TDRs can be used to partially
address these concerns.
As a practical matter, however, the perceived unfairness of
agricultural zoning as applied to affected landowners is overstated for
several reasons. First, of course, the impact on regulated owners of
farmland is by no means all negative, especially as regards those who
prefer to farm rather than convert to other uses. In such cases the
restriction must be viewed as part of the broader comprehensive plan and
the various reciprocal benefits it bestows on affected landowners. In
particular, those intending to farm are insulated from the problems
accompanying more intensive uses by similar restrictions on neighboring
properties.66 This provides significant benefits to farmland, thus at least
partially offsetting the economic impact.
Second, even for landowners who want to convert the property to
more profitable uses, the argument that agricultural zoning is inherently
64. See White, supra note 19, at 118.
65. The Supreme Court itself has often emphasized the importance of fairness in its
own takings analysis, most recently stating in Palazzolo that the Penn Central balancing test
must be applied with attention to principles of "fairness and justice." 533 U.S. at 607; see
also, Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). Scholars have also suggested that
"fairness" is a central concern in the takings issue. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. FISCHEL,
REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 6 (1995); Frank 1. Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just
Compensation " Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1171-72 (1967).
66. See DANIELS& BOWERS, supra note 7, at 109.
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unfair because of its economic impact on property owners remains
overstated. First, the fairness argument assumes that the entire profit
potential of private property is attributable to the landowner, when in fact a
substantial portion of private property value is often established by
government "givings." Government givings are actions which enhance,
rather than diminish, property values. As noted by various commentators,
much of the value of farmland is a result of such givings.61 This might
occur with farmland in numerous ways, such as farm subsidy programs and
mortgage deductions, both of which indirectly enhance farmland values.
More directly on point, zoning and land use controls themselves
enhance land values by minimizing the harms that might otherwise affect
landowners, especially those arising from incompatible land uses. Thus,
the very scheme of restricting property use adds significant value to
neighboring property. Specifically, the increased value of agricultural land
in alternative residential use in part exists because government zoning
protects any residential development from conflicting industrial and
commercial use. Any fairness arguments based on diminution in value
necessarily reflect property values largely enhanced by protective
government regulatory schemes.
Perhaps the most obvious example of government givings in regard to
farmland subject to development pressure is basic infrastructure support
that makes land developable in the first place. This is particularly relevant
with regard to farmland preservation issues, where conversion pressure and
enhanced land values typically occur because of government activity that
facilitates conversion to other uses.68  In particular, road and other
infrastructure support, which makes land developable in the first instance,
are paid primarily by general tax revenues and often result in
disproportionate financial benefit to undeveloped land, often farmland, in
proximity to development.69
67. See, e.g., Private Property Rights and Environmental Laws: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works, 104th Cong. 163, 163-65 (1995) (statement of C.
Ford Runge, Professor, Dept. of Agriculture and Applied Economics, University of
Minnesota); Edward Thompson, Jr., The Government Giveth, ENVTL. F., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at
22.
68. See Thompson, supra note 67, at 22.
69. It is important to note, of course, that in recent years developers have been
increasingly required to pay for some infrastructure costs through exaction requirements,
typically in the form of land dedications and impact fees. See generally ALAN A.
ALTSHULER & JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE (1993). As a practical
matter, however, the enhanced value of property through exactions imposed in
government's coordinating function far exceeds the cost of the exaction. Moreover,
property values are also substantially enhanced by government activities not typically
financed by exactions, such as major highways.
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This "givings" analysis suggests that the economic impact of
agricultural zoning on affected landowners is not nearly as great as it might
initially seem. Although agricultural zoning frequently results in a
significant diminution in value compared to alternative uses, much of that
value was created by government activity in the first place. This is not to
minimize the role of private initiative in creating land value, which is
certainly important, nor intended to foreclose the inclusion of
compensatory schemes, such as PDRs, in preserving farmland. But it
suggests that arguments against agricultural zoning because of its
significant economic impact on regulated property owners are misplaced.
It is also important to understand that our legal system and our society
have long recognized that land is affected by a broader public interest.
Although private property rights have been, and remain, an important
component of our economy and legal system, they have never been viewed
as absolute.7° Rather, property rights have traditionally been viewed as
being subject to public rights.7 Thus, when zoning restrictions are
imposed on farmland to serve a public interest they are not necessarily
depriving the owner of pre-existing rights; rather, such a limitation is
inherent in the property to begin with. For this reason, a landowner's
reasonable expectations regarding the future use and transfer of property
necessarily include the recognition that the property might be subject to
restrictions such as zoning to serve a public purpose.
Taken together, the concepts of givings and the nature of private
property suggest that agricultural zoning is not inherently unfair to affected
70. See generally Myri L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a
Lockean Soliloquy: A Role for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26
ENVTL. L. 1095 (1996); Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions of Private Property, Public
Rights and the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265 (1996); Leslie
Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 BUFF. L. REv. 735 (1985).
71. The Supreme Court has frequently recognized that property interests are
implicitly subject to the broader public interest. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394, 410 (1915) (holding that private property interests must at times "yield to the good of
the community" for the sake of "progress"); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209
U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (stating that private property limited by other public interests,
including exercise of the police power "to protect the atmosphere, the water and the
forests.").
Numerous commentators have also observed that our legal tradition has always
viewed private property interests as being subject to certain public rights and interests. See,
e.g., Rose, supra note 70, at 281 (public rights have co-evolved in our legal system with
private rights, with courts seeking a balance between the two); Gerald Torres, Taking and
Giving: Police Power, Public Value, and Private Right, 26 ENVTL. L. 1, 5 (1996) (stressing
the importance of the social function of property, which necessarily limits property rights);
Humbach, supra note 57, at 344-48 (stating that legal property rights are limited by
competing needs of the general welfare).
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landowners, even when the zoning results in a substantial economic impact.
As such, agricultural zoning should not be avoided as a farmland
preservation tool because of perceived unfairness to landowners, nor
should local governments too quickly yield to rezoning requests on fairness
grounds. Though affected landowners no doubt carry a disproportionate
burden from zoning schemes, from a broader regulatory perspective such
burdens are neither unanticipated nor abnormal, and thus, in most
instances, should not be viewed as unfair.
That being said, to the extent possible it makes sense to attempt to
mitigate what often appears to be harsh economic impacts on landowners.
First, compensatory alternatives such as PDR and TDR programs should be
used, when possible, to help offset the impacts of zoning. Not only do such
programs help insulate zoning restrictions from change requests, but they
arguably more closely align the burdens with the benefits of farmland
preservation.72 In theory the amount of compensation need only be partial,
discounting the perceived loss by government givings and regulatory risk.
In practice the payment most typically reflects the lost development value
of the property.
Second, fairness concerns can also be partially addressed by careful
planning that identifies property to be preserved before development
pressure arises. By restricting suitable farmland well in advance of
development pressures, landowners have a reasonable opportunity to plan
their affairs accordingly.
C. DEVELOPMENTAL IMPACTS: IS AGRICULTURAL ZONING CONSISTENT
WITH OTHER SOCIETAL NEEDS?
A third impact of agricultural zoning is its effect on broader
development goals that local and state governments might have. Any effort
at preserving farmland must also give substantial attention to growth
concerns and how they relate to farmland preservation. Indeed, the need to
take regulatory steps to preserve farmland primarily becomes an issue
because of the pressure to convert for development purposes. An important
question is what effect agricultural zoning has on the growth/sprawl
pressures that create the need to preserve in the first place.
72. It should be noted that some commentators have raised concerns that
compensating landowners through PDRs constitutes double payments by government, first
by increasing the value of the land by government givings, and second, by then
compensating the landowner for purchase of the development rights. See Thompson, supra
note 67, at 26.
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The answer in part depends on the type of agricultural zoning method
used and its effectiveness in preserving farmland. There is some evidence
that some types of large lot zoning result in increased sprawl by simply
scattering development further out.73  Thus, rather than preserving
farmland, such zoning arguably takes more away. Moreover, it exacerbates
rather than controls sprawl development, with the consequences of sprawl.
This includes increased transportation costs, increased pollution from
vehicle miles traveled, increased infrastructure costs, and increased impacts
from emergency vehicle response time.74
If done correctly, however, agricultural zoning should have the
opposite effect, which is to control or limit sprawl. Assuming development
pressure remains the same, the effect of restricting large areas to
agricultural use is to force development into a more contained area.
Indeed, any farmland preservation program must necessarily be integrated
as part of a more comprehensive effort to address the problems of sprawl,
with each playing off the other. Thus, as efforts to preserve farmland
necessarily lead to more compact development, so too do comprehensive
efforts to address sprawl also necessarily involve preservation of prime
farmland as a logical component. As will be discussed in the next
subsection, attempts at agricultural zoning without compact growth plans
will likely be unsuccessful.
Therefore, perhaps the most immediate consequence of successful
agricultural zoning, if done as part of a broader growth management plan,
is that existing development pressure will likely be directed to more
compact and dense development. This can be done in several ways, but the
end result is similar. Housing density increases and is located closer to
existing urban or suburban areas.
73. See generally Douglas Jackson-Smith & Jill Bukovac, Limitations of
Agricultural Land Use Planning Tools in Rural Wisconsin, PATS STAFF PAPER SERIES
(Program on Agric. Tech. Studies, Madison, Wis.) (July 2000), available at
http://www.wisc.edu/pats/publuse/htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2002).
74. See infra note 75.
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This, in turn, has a number of positive impacts in addition to the
preservation of farmland, including lower infrastructure costs, decreased
transportation costs, decreased air pollution and energy consumption, and
lower response time for delivery of government services.75 In total, these
represent significant social gains by limiting the adverse consequences of
sprawl development.
There are, however, several potential social costs to such a compact
development alternative. First is the denial of consumer preference by
forcing compact development and limiting the possibility of large lot,
scattered development. As a practical matter, we have sprawl because that
is what a significant number of consumers want. Although the concept of
sprawl itself is displeasing to most, the type of development that creates
sprawl - large lot, scattered homes - is itself quite pleasing to many.
76
Indeed, the need for agricultural zoning is predicated on the fact that the
market, reflecting consumer preferences, is inclined toward sprawl. Thus,
effective agricultural zoning, if properly combined with a plan for compact
development, arguably results in a denial of consumer preferences.77
The basic response to this is that consumer preferences, though
arguably reflecting what is best for those engaged in any particular
75. The social costs of suburban sprawl have been well documented. See, e.g.,
Robert W. Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, A National Perspective on Land Use Policy
Alternatives and Consequences, Farm Foundation (Paper prepared for National Public
Policy Education Conference, Portland, Oregon, Sept. 22, 1998); Henry R. Richmond, From
Sea to Shining Sea: Manifest Destiny and the National Land Use Dilemma, 13 PACE L.
REv. 327, 335-36 (1993); William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem
of Institutional Complexity, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 57, 69-77 (1999); Robert H. Freilich &
Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 183 (1997). In recent years,
however, some scholars have questioned the social costs of sprawl, stating that they are not
nearly as great as thought and, indeed, sprawl brings benefits to society, primarily in the
form of consumer choice. See, e.g., Clint Bolick, Subverting the American Dream:
Government Dictated Smart Growth is Unwise and Unconstitutional, 148 U. PA. L. REv.
859 (2000); Peter Gordon & Harry W. Richardson, The Economic Effects of Arizona's
Proposed Citizen's Growth Management Initiative, at
http://www.usc.edu/schools/sppd/research/arizona/arizona.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2001).
For an excellent overview of the debate on the effects of sprawl, see Robert W. Burchell &
Naveed A. Shad, The Evolution of the Sprawl Debate in the United States, 5 HASTINGS W. -
N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 137 (1999).
76. Commentators have often acknowledged that sprawl reflects consumer choice.
See, e.g., Burchell & Shad, supra note 75; DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 7, at 133-34.
77. Harvard law professor Gerald Frug, a supporter of Smart Growth initiatives,
recently argued that effective growth management goes beyond a denial of consumer
preferences, but calls for a truly revolutionary restructuring of society in terms of housing
choices, decreased reliance on the automobile, and "ending the current division of American
metropolitan areas along the lines of class, race, and ethnicity." Gerald E. Frug, Euphemism
as a Political Strategy, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 11189 (2000).
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transaction, frequently fail to consider the broader social costs of their
actions and thus lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. In particular,
the market, as reflected in consumer choices, fails to consider all the costs
and benefits in a transaction; they are external to the decisionmaking
process.78 As it concerns consumer preferences for scatter development,
consumers fail to consider the previously noted societal costs associated
with sprawl: increased energy and transportation costs, increased pollution,
infrastructure costs, and farmland loss. Beyond that, the preference for
scatter development is itself heavily subsidized by government
infrastructure costs, especially in terms of roads. 79  Taken together, the
subsidized nature of the consumer choice for sprawl, along with the
significant external costs imposed on the rest of society, indicate that denial
of such consumer preferences is neither inefficient nor problematic.
Indeed, combating sprawl, of which farmland preservation is one
dimension, should result in significant social gains.
A second potential development cost that might result from effective
agricultural zoning concerns what effect, if any, it might have on the price
of new housing by limiting the supply of land. The preservation of
farmland in and of itself would appear to enhance neighboring property
values because of the environmental amenities that it brings. Yet
agricultural zoning might potentially raise the cost of new entry level
development by limiting the supply of available land for new construction.
All else being equal, when the supply of a commodity decreases, and
demand remains the same, the price increases.
As is true with many issues surrounding sprawl, there is substantial
disagreement on what effect growth management strategies have on
housing prices. Studies of Oregon's urban growth boundaries designed to
contain growth and preserve farmland, suggest some increase in housing
prices resulting from the limited land supply.8
0
78. See Buzbee, supra note 75, at 84-85.
79. See Burchell & Shad, supra note 75, at 3-4.
80. See Samuel R. Staley & Gerard C. S. Mildner, Urban-Growth Boundaries and
Housing Affordability: Lessons from Portland, at http://www.rppi.org/urban/pbl .html (last
visited Aug. 21, 2001); Raymond J. Burby, Arthur C. Nelson, Dennis Parker & John
Handmer, Urban Containment Policy and Disaster: Is there a Connection, at
http://www.unc.edu/depts/dcrpweb/facstaff/faculty/burby/Urban-Containment-Policy.pdf
(last visited Mar. 17, 2002) (summarizing studies).
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This has also been theorized by a number of opponents of growth
controls.8 1 Others, however, have suggested that efforts to combat sprawl
need not increase housing costs, and, indeed, sprawl itself has a negative
impact on affordable housing.82
Despite this disagreement, it would appear that the actual impact of
agricultural zoning on the cost of new entry housing prices in part depends
on whether there are concomitant plans for more compact growth. To the
extent that government decreases the supply of land through agricultural
zoning, but fails to pursue compact growth alternatives, then arguably the
cost of new housing will increase. This might occur where government
maintains low-density residential restrictions, such as half acre lot
minimums, while at the same time removing substantial acreage from the
market through agricultural zoning. As a consequence, the cost of raw land
would go up, and likely be passed on to consumers.83 This would be
particularly problematic with regard to provision of affordable housing for
low and moderate income families.84
On the other hand, if effective efforts at compact growth accompany
agricultural zoning, as they should, the overall effect might well be to
decrease entry housing costs. First, by using less land per home, compact
housing reduces the percentage of housing costs attributable to raw land.
85
A recent study indicates that this alone is sufficient to reduce the cost of
housing.86 Second, the infrastructure costs are generally lower for compact
housing, which should reduce its overall costs as well. Taken together,
these suggest that agricultural zoning should not have an adverse effect on
81. See Gordon & Richardson, supra note 75; Bolick, supra note 75; Paul J.
Boudreaux, Looking the Ogre in the Eye: Ten Tough Questions for the Antisprawl
Movement, 14 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 171, 188-89 (2000); see also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON &
VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 996 (2d ed. 2000) (noting that
most empirical studies conclude that growth controls raise housing prices).
82. See Freilich & Peshoff, supra note 75, at 191.
83. See J. D. Landis, Land Regulation and the Price of New Housing: Lessons from
Three California Cities, 52 J. OF AM. PLANNING ASS'N 9 (1986).
84. Commentators and some courts have often noted that large lot zoning can have
an "exclusionary" effect on low and moderate income families because those families
cannot afford the higher prices demanded for such land. See Britton v. Town of Chester,
595 A.2d 492 (N.H. 1991); S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 336
A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). DANIEL R.
MANDELKER, ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOPMENT 371-79 (4th ed.
1995). Combining large lot, residential zoning with agricultural zoning can be particularly
problematic, since the exclusionary effect of the large lot zoning might be exacerbated by
removing other land from the housing market through agricultural zoning. Id.
85. See Burchell & Shad, supra note 75, at 18-19.
86. See id.
2002]
NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
new housing costs when combined with provisions for greater residential
density development.
87
As a practical matter, of course, the actual cost for new housing will
depend on a number of variables, including market demand for various
types of housing in the community, the amount of land that is available for
residential use, and developer incentives. For that reason, communities
must remain sensitive to the potential impact agricultural zoning has on
housing prices, and in particular, affordable housing for low and moderate
income families.88 At a minimum this should be addressed through
separate plan and zoning provisions addressing the need for affordable
housing and sensitive monitoring of any impacts that might occur. Special
care should also be given to ensure that sufficient quantities of land are
reserved for development and that zoning restrictions which impede low
and moderate income housing are removed. 89
D. PRESERVATION IMPACTS: IS AGRICULTURAL ZONING EFFECTIVE IN
PRESERVING FARMLAND?
A final, and perhaps the most significant, issue is whether agricultural
zoning is effective in actually preserving farmland from conversion to other
uses. As noted in the introduction, zoning has several major strengths
relative to other preservation methods. It is able to quickly preserve large
tracts of contiguous land for farming, creating an assurance of insulation
and stability for future decisionmaking. Moreover, by taking the decision
to convert away from property owners, it avoids the problems posed by
87. Indeed, if agricultural zoning is accompanied by more compact and dense
development, this might actually help increase opportunities for affordable housing by
eliminating or minimizing various "exclusionary zoning" techniques, such as large lot
zoning.
88. For a sensitive examination of the way growth controls might adversely affect
affordable housing, see Candida M. Ruesga, Note, The Great Wall of Phoenix?: Urban
Growth Boundaries and Arizona's Affordable Housing Market, 32 AiZ. ST. L.J. 1063
(2000).
89. As an example, Oregon's approach to land use requires that local governments
engage in comprehensive planning, which must be guided by nineteen state-wide planning
goals. These include goals for both protection of agricultural land (No. 3), urban growth
boundaries (No. 14), and for affordable housing (No. 10). For a discussion of how Oregon
addresses exclusionary zoning concerns within this framework, see Terry D. Morgan,
Exclusionary Zoning: Remedies Under Oregon 's Land Use Planning Program, 14 ENVTL.
L. 779 (1984); see also Note, State-Sponsored Growth Management as a Remedy for
Exclusionary Zoning, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1137 (1995) (stating that the Oregon system
"has been the model for a successful 'balance of low-income housing needs with
environmentalists' desires to preserve open space.").
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right-to-farm laws and tax programs. At the same time there is no cost,
thus avoiding the significant limitations posed by PDR programs. Finally,
zoning is familiar to most people and can fit within a broader
comprehensive zoning scheme to which the entire community is subject.
For all these reasons, agricultural zoning is a necessary foundation to
any effort to preserve farmland. The question continues to be, however,
whether zoning remains an effective preservation technique by itself. This,
in turn, requires some understanding of why conversion of farmland
occurs. The primary reason for most farmland conversion is simple
economics: as the suburbs expand, farmland will bring in a higher price in
alternative, more intensive land uses, such as residential or commercial.
Whatever its broader worth to society as farmland, to the immediate parties
involved the land is often more valuable once it is converted.
A second reason for conversion, which plays into the first, is that
farming the land is no longer a viable alternative for the landowner. This
might be due to factors unrelated to land use issues, such as the general
state of the farm economy or the lack of an interested heir to continue
farming when the current owner retires. However, it might also result from
encroaching development itself undermining the viability of farming,
including increasing interferences with non-farm uses and the elimination
of a critical mass to sustain a local farm economy. Moreover, it has been
hypothesized that at some point an "impermanence syndrome" occurs, in
which farmers stop investing in farm enterprises because of the perception
that farming will not remain viable.90 This lack of further investment acts
to hasten the conversion spiral.
As should be apparent, these two forces mutually reinforce each other
in creating conversion pressure. Economic incentives to convert farmland
diminish the local farmland base, creating conflicts with new development
and undermining farm vitality.9' Remaining farms thus become even more
susceptible to conversion, even for farmers who might otherwise be
inclined to remain in farming. Moreover, the case for granting zoning
exceptions becomes stronger when farming no longer appears viable.
Thus, any effort at farmland preservation must have an eye to both these
concerns.
In theory, agricultural zoning would appear to effectively address both
these concerns. First, as previously noted, zoning in effect removes the
90. See Arthur C. Nelson, Farmland Preservation Policies: What Works, What
Doesn 't, and What We Don't Know, available at
http://www.farmlandinfo.org/fic/ft/ohio/nelson.html (last visited July 23, 2001).
91. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 839-40 (describing the "mutually reinforcing
problems of farming in the shadow of the suburbs.").
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decision to convert from the landowner. Thus, absent a zoning change, the
landowner cannot convert the property to more intensive land uses, no
matter how great the economic incentives.
Second, zoning would also appear to create a stable environment in
which farming can remain a viable economic enterprise, at least to the
extent it can be controlled by local government. In particular, by
segregating large areas of farmland from other conflicting land uses, zoning
avoids potential conflicts that interfere with farm activities. Zoning can
also help ensure the maintenance of a large mass of farmland which is
necessary for the preservation of the farm economy. Moreover, in theory
zoning should address the "impermanence syndrome" by stabilizing
farmland uses against conversion. 92 If farmers perceive stability of farm
use that zoning can create, they will continue to invest in their own farming
activity.
Despite these theoretical strengths, the conventional wisdom is that
zoning is not a particularly effective farmland preservation method. The
fundamental concern about the effectiveness of agricultural zoning is the
inherent impermanence of any system based on political choice. In
particular, numerous commentators have noted that the opportunity to
change zoning restrictions through variances and rezonings undermines its
effectiveness as a long-term answer to farmland conversion. 93 Especially
problematic is what is seen as a lack of political will to withstand requests
for change. As a result, what often begins as a strong preservation plan on
paper, soon evaporates in a succession of rezonings to accommodate
development pressure.
The frequent inability of local government to withstand pressure to
change arguably results from several of the previously discussed impacts of
zoning. On the one hand, agricultural zoning often results in significant
diminution in property value for the affected property owner, at times
creating a perception of unfairness that makes the case for change seem
more reasonable. On the other hand, substantial development pressure for
consumer preferences for larger lots is often evident. Taken together, they
create a powerful pressure for rezoning of agricultural land to more
92. See Sean F. Nolon & Cozata Solloway, Comment, Preserving Our Heritage:
Tools to Cultivate Agricultural Preservation in New York State, 17 PACE L. REv. 591, 622
(1997).
93. See, e.g., White, supra note 19, at 118-19;Nolon & Solloway, supra note 92, at
628; Michael T. Peddle, The Effects of Growth Management Policies on Agricultural Land
Values, available at http://www.farmlandinfo.org/cae/wp/wp97-7.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2002); David L. Szlanfucht, Note, How to Save America's Depleting Supply of Farmland, 4
DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 333, 349 (1999); Thompson, supra note 17, at 839.
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intensive uses. This is particularly true if there are no clear alternatives for
the inevitable development pressure that builds. Without a clear plan on
how to address housing and other needs, the most expedient route is to
grant change requests.
The concern that the ease of change undermines the effectiveness of
agricultural zoning finds support in studies and anecdotal evidence. For
example, in a study of the effect of agricultural zoning on farmland
preservation in Wisconsin, two researchers found agricultural zoning to
have very little effect on preserving farmland.94 Using data from over 800
towns in Wisconsin, the study examined the rate of farmland loss between
1990 and 1997.9  After controlling for various other factors that might
influence the loss of farmland, the study concluded that there was "no
convincing evidence that the presence of an Exclusive Agricultural Zoning
ordinance had a strong mediating impact on the rate of farmland lOSS.,96
The authors suggested that the mere presence of agricultural zoning
was in and of itself an insignificant factor in preserving farmland. Rather,
as frequently observed by others, the critical factor is a local government's
willingness to enforce existing language and, in particular, to consistently
say no to zoning change requests that would permit development.
Communities with strong zoning language, but which frequently granted
rezonings, lost farmland as rapidly as those with no zoning at all.
However, communities with modest zoning language but which were
resistant to change requests were effective in preserving farmland.97
While recognizing this basic weakness in zoning as a preservation
tool, two points should be made in its defense. To the extent zoning is
unstable, it is not necessarily a weakness of the tool itself, but rather those
implementing it. As noted by scholars, when communities have a strong
commitment to preserving farmland, zoning works quite well.98 Thus, the
basic problem is the community's fundamental commitment to preserving
farmland to begin with. For those serious about preservation, agricultural
zoning is effective.
Second, zoning change mechanisms, the supposed achilles heel of
zoning when it comes to preserving farmland, are not in and of themselves
a weakness of a properly conceived system, but instead a strength. They
provide what would otherwise be a static system insensitive to changing
local and societal needs with the flexibility to respond to the inevitable






NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
changes that occur. In theory these change mechanisms permit zoning to
more accurately respond to the correct use of land, granting change when it
is in the public's interest and denying it when it is not. This is arguably
good, since a truly effective farmland preservation system is not one that
preserves farmland at all costs, but one that preserves farmland when the
land is more valuable when it is preserved, and converts it when it is more
valuable as converted.
The problem, of course, and this brings us closer to the primary
weakness of zoning, is that the typical change request tends to focus on the
interests of the immediate parties, and thus to short-change broader and
long-term societal interests. This is in part due to incomplete information.
In the same way that markets fail because of incomplete information, so too
do political and governmental decisions. Thus, what is the correct
allocation of land resources is often at best only an estimated guess in any
particular situation.
99
More significant, political decision making tends to discount broader,
more diffuse, and long-term societal interests, giving greater weight to
immediate concerns. By their very nature many of the interests supporting
farmland preservation extend beyond the local community and benefit
regional and national interests, as well as future generations. This certainly
is true of food security, which is a national and very long-term concem.
1°°
But even some of the environmental amenities often associated with
farmland preservation, such as reduced pollution and energy consumption,
extend beyond the local community. To the extent that these reflect
societal interests beyond the local decision-maker's own immediate
constituency, it is not surprising that they are heavily discounted or ignored
altogether. This is particularly true when those seeking change from an
agricultural zoning restriction present what appear to be immediate
concerns, especially when surrounding property has already been
developed.101
99. See Buzbee, supra note 75, at 89-90 (discussing informational problems that
arise because input at local levels tends to come from concentrated interests of those who
benefit from sprawl, rather than from dispersed interests of those who benefit from
controlling sprawl).
100. As noted in note 1, supra, there is substantial uncertainty over whether food
security is even a real concern. As acknowledged by Lawrence W. Libby, a leading
proponent of farmland preservation, there is no concern about our ability to produce food
for the immediate future, and most current projections are "sanguine" about our food
production capacity until about 2050. See Lawrence W. Libby, Farmland Protection for
Illinois: The Planning and Legal Issues, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 425, 427 (1997).
101. See Buzbee, supra note 75, at 79-88. Professor Buzbee provides an in-depth
analysis of the institutional problems of addressing farmland conversion and sprawl at the
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Thus, for a combination of reasons, including the lack of political will
to resist change and the perception, as well as the reality, that many of the
benefits of preservation extend beyond the local community, agricultural
zoning, by itself, is limited in its effectiveness as a preservation method.
Efforts to improve agricultural zoning as a preservation technique must
therefore address the problem of change and the underlying environment
that gives rise to excessive change. As suggested above, this is in part an
uphill battle, given the short-term and immediate focus of political decision
making. Yet arguably, certain steps can be taken to address at least some
of the underlying concerns giving rise to excessive change.
Most fundamentally, there must be a clear sense of, and commitment
to, the idea that farmland preservation is an important societal goal. If
government is truly resolved to protect farmland, then zoning is a cost
effective way to preserve large tracts of land. At a minimum this requires
early and full involvement of all stakeholders in supporting agricultural
zoning, especially the farming community itself.102 To the extent farmers
see zoning not as a threat, but as a tool designed to protect the local farm
economy, their support can be critical in resisting conversion pressure.
Moreover, to the extent the perceived purpose of the zoning is to support a
strong local farm economy, rather than simply supply environmental
amenities, it is more likely to be seen in the community's interest to resist
change.
Zoning must also be used in such a way that farming remains a viable
economic option, thus avoiding one of the two reasons for conversion.
Most importantly, this means resisting unnecessary change in the first
instance, since the perception of easy and inevitable change itself
undermines the viability of zoning, which in turn leads to even greater
change pressure. In addition, the initial zoning designations must provide
for a sufficient acreage to ensure continuation of a vital local farming
community.
Beyond that, the conditions giving rise to excessive change can be
addressed through measures designed to stabilize zoning generally.
Perhaps most important is sound planning, ensuring adequate opportunity
for development while drawing clear lines where development will be
local level. He notes that:
no single unit of government bears most of the costs of sprawl or is
likely to bear the blame for sprawl's harms and inconveniences.
Moreover, the widely felt harms and discomforts of sprawl do not fall in
a concentrated way on any particular segment of the public that is likely
to be roused to political action.
Id. at 85.
102. See DANIELS & BowERs, supra note 7, at 123-24.
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prohibited. Especially critical are adequate provisions to accommodate
anticipated growth, most likely in the form of plans for more compact
development. Without a clear plan of how to address housing and other
needs, the most expedient route is to grant change requests. Thus, to the
extent that agricultural zoning removes significant amounts of land from
the housing market, there needs to be a clear plan of how housing needs
will be addressed without the necessity of rezoning agricultural land.
There are other measures that can be used to support agricultural
zoning, including selective use of PDRs and TDRs, as well as urban growth
boundaries. These, along with coordination of zoning with compact
growth plans, will be examined more closely in the next section of this
paper on future directions for agricultural zoning.
III. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Agricultural zoning is a necessary component of any comprehensive
effort to protect farmland. That will undoubtedly remain true even as
efforts are made to identify new, and fine-tune existing, farmland
preservation methods. The ability of zoning to restrict substantial amounts
of farmland, at minimal cost to government and within existing legal
parameters, will continue to make it an attractive, and even indispensable,
preservation tool.
At the same time, the role of agricultural zoning in farmland
preservation faces several significant challenges, some of which overlap
with each other. Most significant among these are: continued concerns
about "takings;" perceptions of unfairness to restricted property owners;
potential conflicts with affordable housing goals; the necessity of
coordinating agricultural zoning with growth management strategies; and,
the instability of zoning as a farmland preservation technique because of
the ease with which change is often permitted. With these considerations
in mind, the following recommendations are made for the future of
agricultural zoning as a centerpiece of farmland preservation efforts.
A. AGRICULTURAL ZONING RESTRICTIONS MUST BE DESIGNED SO AS TO
LIMIT USE TO FARMING
Agricultural zoning is of little use if it permits a variety of other uses,
which is sometimes the case. 10 3 The best alternative is exclusive
103. See White, supra note 19, at 120-22 (discussing problems initially faced in
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agricultural zoning, which prohibits any use unrelated to farming.' 4 To the
extent large lot zoning is used, minimum lot sizes should conform to the
size of the farm in the region and be of sufficient size to avoid the problem
of purchase just for residential use. Thus, requirements of one house per
five acres will do little good, since the restricted parcel is too small for
viable farms and is attractive for residential development.105 This will
actually exacerbate sprawl, rather than control it.1°6 Instead, minimum lot
sizes need to be substantially larger so as to conform to viable farm sizes.
B. AGRICULTURAL ZONING NEEDS TO PRESERVE A SUFFICIENTLY LARGE
AREA TO ENSURE MAINTENANCE OF A VIABLE FARM ECONOMY
In the long run agricultural zoning will succeed only if the fanning
community itself is confident that farming will remain viable, thereby
encouraging continued investment in fanning. 0 7  Although resistance to
unnecessary change is perhaps most important in this respect, the initial
designation of a critical mass of land is also important in maintaining a
viable farming economy.
Oregon when a variety of nonfarm uses were at first permitted in Exclusive Agricultural
Zones).
104. See MALONE, supra note 5, § 6.08[3].
105. See Jackson-Smith & Bukovac, supra note 73, at 6.
106. See Mark R. Rielley, Comment, Evaluating Farmland Preservation Through
Suffolk County, New York's Purchase of Development Rights Program, 18 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 197, 214 (2000).
107. See id. at 211-12.
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C. AGRICULTURAL ZONING SHOULD 6CCUR AS PART OF COMPREHENSIVE
PLANNING, IDENTIFYING SUITABLE LAND IN ADVANCE OF DEVELOPMENT
PRESSURE
The need for early identification of land to be zoned agriculturally
serves several purposes. First, it helps avoid one of the few instances in
which a taking might even arguably be found.'08 Second, advance planning
provides fairness to affected landowners, who can plan both farming and
financial activities accordingly. Third, perceptions of unfairness are
greatest when highly valuable property is downzoned, a scenario made less
likely by early identification and zoning of farmland. Fourth, early
identification facilitates optimal use of buffer areas and PDRs, which will
make agricultural zoning restrictions more resistant to change.
D. AGRICULTURAL ZONING NEEDS TO OCCUR IN COORDINATION WITH A
REALISTIC PLAN TO ACCOMMODATE AND CHANNEL GROWTH
Agricultural zoning without a plan to accommodate anticipated
growth will lead to one of several undesirable outcomes. First, and most
likely, there will be substantial pressure to change the agricultural
restrictions in order to accommodate the growth, leading to an undermining
of the farmland preservation efforts.' °9 Second, if the government remains
firm in its agricultural restrictions, then potential problems with affordable
housing arise. 0 Thus, any attempt to restrict agricultural land, and thereby
reduce the available supply of raw land for housing stock, must at the same
time know how it will address anticipated housing needs.
108. As discussed in Part II.A of this article, agricultural zoning will rarely constitute
a taking under current constitutional analysis as long as the property is suitable for farming
and is economically viable. Even where there is substantial diminution in value due to a
downzoning, there is still probably not a taking under the Penn Central balancing test. See
supra text accompanying notes 49-52. Yet to the extent a taking might result, it would
likely in part be based upon property that was purchased at a price reflecting currently
permitted development opportunities and which was then downzoned resulting in substantial
diminution in value. Early identification of land to be zoned agricultural avoids this
scenario.
109. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 837 (suggesting that one reason there has been
so little farmland rezoned to other uses in Montgomery County's Maryland's farmland
preservation program is that a significant portion of rural land was reserved to accommodate
future growth, thus avoiding the necessity of rezoning land intended to be preserved as
farmland).
110. See supra text accompanying notes 80-89.
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What constitutes a realistic plan to accommodate growth will
necessarily depend on a number of variables unique to a region. It should,
of course, guide development away from prime agricultural land. It should
also provide a sufficient amount of land for residential development,
depending on what a community's goals and housing needs are. This
might include varying levels of agriculturally restricted property, with less
desirable land targeted for eventual development later. This provides a
flexible means of accommodating growth pressure while avoiding loss of a
region's best farmland.
In most cases this will also require plans for more compact growth and
higher density residential development. Many of the areas facing the
greatest loss of farmland also anticipate substantial population growth in
the near future."' At a minimum, this necessitates removal of minimum lot
size requirements inconsistent with compact development. It makes little
sense, and even invites erosion of agricultural zoning controls, to limit
development to two or three houses per acre when facing significant
population increases while seeking to preserve farmland. Beyond that,
many communities need to affirmatively encourage compact development.
E. AGRICULTURAL ZONING NEEDS TO WORK IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER
FARMLAND PRESERVATION TECHNIQUES, AND IN PARTICULAR WITH PDRS
AND TDRS
Other farmland preservation programs, though insufficient in and of
themselves to preserve farmland, can help to address some potential
weaknesses of zoning. Indeed, a substantial amount of academic
commentary in recent years has emphasized the need to combine
agricultural zoning with other farmland preservation techniques for an
effective program." Such multifaceted programs, emphasizing PDRs and
TDRs in particular, provide mutually reinforcing controls that address the
weaknesses of zoning.
PDRs in particular can be used in a mutually supportive role with
agricultural zoning. On the one hand, agricultural zoning can decrease the
cost of PDRs by lowering development potential in a region. Moreover,
agricultural zoning can insure that PDRs do not inadvertently increase
111. See A. ANN. SORENSON ET AL., AMERICAN FARMLAND TRUST, FARMING ON THE
EDGE 8-16 (1997) (documenting growth and development pressures in regions facing
greatest farmland loss).
112. See DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 7, at 235; Thompson, supra note 17, at
844-51; White, supra note 19, at 115.
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development by attracting people to take advantage of preserved land." 3
At the same time, use of PDRs can support agricultural zoning in several
significant ways. First, to the extent used, they help address the perception
of unfairness that exists and helps assure acceptance of restrictions. This is
true even for those who might not be the immediate recipients of PDRs, if
they perceive the availability of PDRs at a later date. 14 Second, it can add
to the farming stability of a community, making it less likely that
decisionmakers will yield to pressure to rezone agriculturally restricted
land. Third, PDRs can be used to create an appropriate buffer between
development and agriculturally zoned land.
This final point highlights the need. for strategic use of PDRs in
relation to zoning, balancing several competing concerns. On the one
hand, they arguably should not be used too close, where development
might be inevitable. Conversely, the use of PDRs too far out is a poor use
of the funds. Instead, it makes the most sense to use them near where a
.growth line should be formed, creating a buffer between more intensive
uses and other farmland subject to agricultural zoning. This potentially
serves several purposes. First, it insulates the property most subject to
development pressure from conversion, thus decreasing conversion
pressure on the agricultural zoned property. Second, it helps the perception
of farming stability, encouraging investment.
Communities should also consider use of TDRs as a compliment to
agricultural zoning, primarily as a means of offsetting the perceived
financial hardship on affected landowners that zoning might create. TDRs
are a compensatory source for landowners without the fiscal limitations of
PDRs, a major advantage. For this reason they have been successfully used
as a compliment to agricultural zoning in a few instances, most notably
Montgomery County in Maryland and the Pinelands in New Jersey.' '5 In
both cases, the TDRs have provided a compensatory basis for zoning,
helping to ensure its acceptability in the farming community, while also
helping to provide for increased development density within designated
growth areas.
113. See DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 7, at 238-39.
114. See Thompson, supra note 17, at 845-46.
115. See DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 7, at 179-86 (discussing success of various
TDR programs); White, supra note 19, at 135-40 (discussing success of the Pinelands
program).
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As noted earlier, however, TDRs require the right mix of development
conditions suitable to absorb transferred development, as well as stability
of zoning controls within those areas, a relatively rare occurrence. 16 For
that reason, few successful TDR programs have emerged, despite their
significant popularity in academic literature. Moreover, TDR programs
must be carefully coordinated with the need for greater compact and dense
development that will normally need to accompany agricultural zoning. On
the one hand they seem to provide the perfect solution, since the TDRs are
used to increase density and at the same time compensate restricted
landowners. Yet for the TDRs to generate sufficient value, receiving areas
must initially limit development density. This is arguably at odds with the
need for compact growth and increased residential density mentioned
above, and might in fact undermine zoning restrictions, especially if the
TDR market fails to function properly." 7 Thus, although the use of TDRs
as a compliment to zoning should be explored, communities need to be
sensitive to how they are coordinated with other components of a
successful agricultural zoning system.
F. FINALLY, WHERE APPROPRIATE, USE OF REASONABLE URBAN GROWTH
BOUNDARIES SHOULD ACCOMPANY AGRICULTURAL ZONING
Urban Growth Boundaries (UGB) have the potential to be highly
effective tools to stabilize agricultural zoning, since by their very nature
they are designed to contain growth within certain limits." 8  This
eliminates or minimiiizes leapfrog development that can slowly erode
agricultural zoning schemes. Perhaps most significantly, they provide a
solid basis for denial of zoning change requests and at the same time give
farmland located outside the boundaries assurance of stability.
116. If requests for greater density development in receiving areas are given with
relative ease, as is often the case, then the TDRs lose whatever worth they might otherwise
have.
117. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 81, at 193 ("[t]o make TDRs valuable, [a]
city may restrict permitted densities in the receiving area below what the city otherwise
would have been willing to permit."). This runs counter to the need for increased density
within areas zoned for development to offset the removal of rawland for housing resulting
from agricultural zoning. If the TDR market functions properly, the increased density
occurs through use of the TDRs. However, if the TDR market fails to operate properly, then
the result is a decrease in residential density, which, together with agricultural zoning might
pose problems for the availability of affordable housing. See supra text accompanying
notes 80-89.
118. For a description of Urban Growth Boundaries, especially as used in Oregon,
see ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 81, at 989-95.
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To work properly, such boundaries must balance several competing
concerns. Perhaps most significantly, they need to be realistic in their
expectations and provide for reasonable opportunities for growth."l 9 In
most cases this will also require plans for compact growth and higher
density development, with special attention to ensuring affordable housing
opportunities. Finally, there needs to be a provision for periodic review of
the boundaries in response to changing local needs. 2 °
To date, the limited experience with UGBs has been mixed in terms of
their success in preserving farmland. The most extensive use of such
boundaries has been in Oregon, 21 where results have been uneven
throughout the state. Although boundaries have worked reasonably well in
the Portland metropolitan area, the experience has been more tenuous in
other areas, with significant development often occurring outside the UGBs
and only limited amounts of multiple-family development taking place
within UGBs. 122 Further, there is some evidence that UGBs in the Portland
area have increased housing costs. 123 Nonetheless, in comparison to other
areas, the use of UGBs in Oregon appears to be successful in preserving
farmland. 124  Where growth boundaries have been combined with both
agricultural zoning and PDRs and/or TDRs, such as in Lancaster,
Pennsylvania and Montgomery County, Maryland, the success in
preserving farmland has been even more apparent.125
119. See, e.g., id. at 994 (stating that Portland, Oregon's UGB included significant
room to accommodate future growth).
120. This, however, poses the potential problem that communities will quickly
redraw UGBs in response to development pressure, similar to what many currently do with
regard to agricultural zoning. See White, supra note 19, at 119-20 (discussing this problem
in parts of Oregon).
121. Goal Fourteen of Oregon's mandated nineteen state-wide planning goals
provides for creation of urban growth boundaries, and states that the "establishment and
change of the boundaries shall be based upon . . .retention of agricultural land," with
priorities set for different classes of farmland. See White, supra note 19, at 120.
122. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 81, at 992-94.
123. See sources cited supra note 80.
124. See Richmond, supra note 75, at 346-47 (stating that on balance, most
commentators believe the Oregon experiment has been successful).
125. See DANIELS & BOWERS, supra note 7, at 14142 (discussing success of the
Lancaster program, which includes a mix of agricultural zoning, PDRs, and urban growth
boundaries); Thompson, supra note 17, at 836-37 (discussing success of Montgomery
County program, which includes a mix of agricultural zoning, PDRs, TDRs, and what the
author calls an "urban limit line," beyond which development is heavily restricted).
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CONCLUSION
Despite its shortcomings, agricultural zoning must remain a core
component of farmland preservation efforts. It permits local government to
immediately restrict large amounts of land at little or no cost, providing the
potential for a stable farming environment and removing the ability of
landowners to convert the property to more intensive uses. Even though
this might have a significant economic impact on regulated landowners, if
done properly it should not constitute an unconstitutional taking nor be
viewed as inherently unfair.
At the same time, the effective use of agricultural zoning must
recognize its limitations, especially the problem of government too readily
granting rezonings and thereby eroding the system of controls. Thus, to the
extent possible, efforts must be made to address conditions that create
change pressures, and to integrate zoning into a more comprehensive
farmland preservation program. Most fundamentally this means a realistic
provision for accommodating growth, which, in many instances, will
require more compact and dense development. Equally important is the
need to integrate agricultural zoning with other preservation techniques,
most notably PDRs, to create a mutually reinforcing set of controls.
Finally, the success of agricultural zoning as a farmland preservation
technique needs to be judged- not only on its ability to preserve farmland,
but also in its compatibility with other societal goals. In particular, the
desire for preserving farmland needs to be balanced against the need for
reasonable growth within the community, with special sensitivity to
ensuring affordable housing opportunities for citizens. Finding an
appropriate balance between the legitimate housing needs of citizens and
the need to protect prime farmland, is, in the long run, not only necessary
for the health of the local community, but will provide a more solid basis
for resisting change to the agricultural zoning restrictions themselves.
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